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Abstract 
This article surveys and contextualizes the British idealists' philosophical 
writings on language, aesthetics and emotions, starting with T.H. Green and 
concluding with Michael Oakeshott. It highlights ways in which their 
philosophical insights have been wrongly overlooked by later writers. It explores 
R.L. Nettleship's posthumous publications in this field and notes that they 
exerted significant influences on British idealists and closely related figures, such 
as Bernard Bosanquet and R.G. Collingwood. The writing of other figures are also 
explored, not least F.H. Bradley and J.A. Smith. The article concludes by 
introducing in turn the remaining articles that are found in this special issue. 
 
Forgotten dimensions of British idealism 
The theme of this special issue is the place of language, aesthetics and emotions 
in the philosophies of the British Idealists. Immediately, this prompts at least two 
key questions: who were these idealists?, and why should this theme be of 
interest today? 
British idealism was the dominant philosophy in Britain and the English-
speaking world during the last decades of the nineteenth-century and the early 
decades of the twentieth century. The British idealists who are most commonly 
discussed by contemporary philosophers and theorists are Thomas Hill Green 
(1836-1882), Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848-
1923), John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925), Robin George Collingwood 
(1889-1943) and Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990). This is only a small 
proportion of the movement, whose prominent members also included John 
Caird (1820-1898), Edward Caird (1835-1908), William Wallace (1843-1897), 
Richard Lewis Nettleship (1846-1892), Henry Jones (1852-1922), David George 
Ritchie (1853-1903), John Henry Muirhead (1855-1940), Richard Burdon 
Haldane (1856-1928), Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931), John 
Alexander Smith (1863-1939) and Harold Henry Joachim (1868-1938). In 
addition, their Italian philosophical interlocutors, especially Benedetto Croce 
(1866-1952) and Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) were important especially in 
relation to the development of later British idealist philosophies of art and the 
philosophy of history.   
Even though they were often described as Hegelians, it is more accurate 
to say that the British idealists had a critical appreciation of both Kant and Hegel, 
but that they were not their followers or adherents to a common ‘Hegelian’ 
school (see Quinton, Absolute Idealism; Collingwood, An Autobiography, 15-16; 
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Mander, British Idealism). Moreover, many were influenced just as significantly 
by Plato and others by Aristotle and Fichteanism (Tyler, ‘Individuality, freedom 
and socialism’; Tyler, ‘Forms, dialectics and the healthy community’). It is 
important to note also that all of the British idealists set new standards for 
scholarly criticism based on firsthand knowledge of the original German, Italian 
and ancient Greek texts, often translating texts themselves, several of which 
remain the basis for standard English editions of foreign-language philosophical 
works. This new scholarship was produced primarily by Bosanquet, both Caird 
brothers, Green, Nettleship, Ritchie and Wallace. The most notable examples of 
now-standard translations are Hegel, Logic of Hegel; Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Mind; Hegel, Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Fine Art. Green initiated the 
translation of Lotze’s Metaphysic and rendered Book 1 ‘On the Connexion of 
Things’ and Book 2, chapter III ‘Of Time’. Bosanquet and A.C. Bradley translated 
parts of the work, with Bosanquet editing the whole volume, with John Cook 
Wilson providing terminological advice on passages dealing with mathematics 
and physics. R.L. Nettleship contributed Book 1 of the associated translation of 
Lotze’s Logic. 
Furthermore, they inspired a generation of philosophers and social 
reformers with their differing views of the unity of experience and the inter-
connectedness of metaphysical, religious, moral, social, and political theorizing. 
They addressed pressing issues in contemporary religious, social, and political 
life and engaged in the critical assessment of contemporary philosophical 
viewpoints, including utilitarianism, empiricism, realism, and pragmatism. They 
were not merely critical: it can be said that British idealism introduced novel, 
radical and holistic ways of approaching philosophical problems at a time when 
the British philosophical atmosphere was stagnant. William Mander comments 
that: ‘While there was, of course, much philosophy in the mid-nineteenth 
century, it is hard to resist Green’s diagnosis that little, if any of it, was very 
creative or original. Native philosophical thought had never moved far from its 
central homes in classical empiricism and the Scottish commonsense school, and 
there was much ignorance of continental thought’ (Mander, ‘Introduction’, 5). 
Whatever view one might take of the British idealists, it remains the case that 
they ‘revitalized British philosophy by making it permeable to a rich variety of 
continental ideas’ (Candlish, ‘Bradley’).  
 The philosophy of the British idealists is not a homogeneous project. Yet, 
there are some fundamental points of agreement which provided a degree of 
unity. Idealism has been described by Watts Cunningham as ‘that philosophical 
doctrine which undertakes to show that, in order to think matter or the spatio-
temporal order of events in its ultimate nature, we are logically compelled to 
think mind or spirit along with it as in some sense foundational to it’ 
(Cunningham Idealistic Argument, 339). The essential thesis is one of mind’s 
involvement in our understanding of the world. This is not the same as saying 
that mind creates the world in itself or that the world is in itself spiritual or 
mental. Rather, the claim is that thought or experience is paramount, and that 
the objects of experience cannot be properly conceived of without reference to 
experiencing subjects. In logic, the British idealists tended to conflate (to the 
modern eye) logic and epistemology; and they regarded logic, epistemology, 
ontology and metaphysics as necessarily intertwined. In ethics and politics they 
were inspired by Greek classical thought (especially the moral and political 
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philosophy of Plato and Aristotle), and by German Idealism (Kant and Hegel). 
With only the occasional exception, they stressed the importance of the relation 
between theory and practice. They focused on the logical interdependence 
between socio-political organization and the development of human capacities: 
self-realization was seen as a social, moral, and spiritual endeavor. The British 
idealist conception of the state qua state as ‘the appropriate framework in which 
individuals have the opportunity to opt for the good life’ (Nicholson Political 
Philosophy, 2) is one which seeks to safeguard both freedom and the common 
good. In their political philosophy, the state is viewed as an enabling structure 
whose interventions can facilitate self-realization and social well-being. 
Later developments in philosophy led to a mistaken belief that only 
analytic philosophers and their successors took a serious philosophical interest 
in language, and that their predecessors were misled by their simplistic attitudes 
towards linguistic questions. In reality and not least through their philosophical 
writings, scholarship and translations, the British idealists showed themselves to 
be highly sensitive to consideration of language, its nature and its proper and 
improper uses. We can easily find examples of where British idealists made 
insightful contributions to philosophical issues surrounding language, as well as 
the other issues discussed in this special issue, emotions, and the aesthetic. Even 
though they are not noted now for having done so, this is largely because critics 
have not looked in the right places or sought to draw these themes out of the 
work of the British idealists. What follows below and in the other contributions 
to this special issue indicates where interesting material can be found.  
 The philosophy of aesthetics of the British idealists remains 
understudied. Many of them were deeply interested in works of literature, 
especially poetry and plays. Hence, Edward Caird (Essays) published substantial 
essays on Dante, Shakespeare, Wordsworth and others, while Henry Jones 
published a book on Robert Browning (Browning). However, while emphasizing 
the philosophical depths of their literary subjects, these works by Caird and 
Jones did not themselves attempt to be fully philosophical treatments of their 
respective subjects. Rather, they were essays aimed at the educated general 
reader. On the positive side, this extended their influence beyond the realm of 
technical philosophy. As a result, the British idealists inspired literary and 
classical scholars such as the classicist Henry Nettleship, Richard Lewis 
Nettleship’s brother, who edited (without credit) many of Green’s religious 
writings for the third volume of Green’s works. Green’s philosophy influenced his 
great friend and brother-in-law, John Addington Symonds, himself a significant 
literary critic and poet, who is now recognized as an important proto-queer 
theorist (see Tyler, ‘J.A. Symonds’). Similarly, A.C. Bradley, F.H. Bradley’s brother, 
is now remembered as an important scholar of literature, particularly of 
Shakespeare. However, the more philosophical and political of his writings 
indicate his own British idealist credentials. (This is particularly true of his essay 
‘International Morality: The United States of Europe’; and ‘Hegel’s Theory of 
Tragedy’, as well as the lectures on Shelley and Keats in the same volume.) A.C. 
Bradley’s standing within the movement is indicated by the fact that, in addition 
to his original contributions, he was entrusted to edit Green’s magnum opus 
Prolegomena to Ethics (1883), one of the movement’s seminal texts. A.C. Bradley 
was also entrusted with editing the second volume of R.L. Nettleship’s 
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Philosophical Remains (of which more later). He also translated the whole of the 
third book (‘Psychology’) of Lotze’s Metaphysic mentioned above. 
 Green’s reputation for being uninterested in aesthetics is understandable 
given that he wrote nothing on the subject apart from two early essays, one 
written for Oxford examiners and the other for the educated general readership 
of The North British Review (Green, ‘Value and Influence of Works of Fiction in 
Modern Times’ and ‘Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life’). Nevertheless, 
that the reputation is ill-deserved is indicated by the recollections of his nephew 
John St Loe Strachey, who recounts Green’s great fondness for Shakespeare, 
Milton, Pope, and Swift, among others (Strachey, ‘Recollection’). Nevertheless, 
Green was very alive to language’s centrality to philosophy, as is indicated by his 
reported advice to R.L. Nettleship to approach philosophy through the lens of 
language (see below). Green was also emphatic that an adequate philosophy of 
ethics and action must always take due account of natural instincts. As David 
Ritchie (Principles of State Interference, 133) observed: Green did not ‘deny that 
Man is a part of Nature, and that human actions are natural events… [although he 
did reject the view that] Man can be understood if he be considered as merely a 
part of Nature and his actions merely as natural events.’ It is for this reason that 
Green (‘On the Different Senses of “Freedom”’, section 17) built his idealism on 
what would now be called a theory of sublimation. 
 
In order to [make] any approach to this satisfaction of itself, the self-
realising principle ... must overcome the “natural impulses”, not in the 
sense of either extinguishing them or denying them an object, but in the 
sense of fusing them with those higher interests, which have human 
perfection in some of its forms for their object.  Some approach to this 
fusion we may notice in all good men, not merely in those in whom all 
natural passions – love, anger, pride, ambition – are enlisted in the service 
of some great public cause, but in those with whom such passions are all 
governed by some such commonplace idea as that of educating a family. 
 
This issue has been analysed in the philosophical literature (Tyler, Metaphysics of 
Self-realisation and Freedom, chapter 5) and is developed still further in Janusz 
Grygieńć’s contribution in this special issue. 
Other British idealists addressed the relationship of reason and emotions, 
of course. F.H. Bradley’s philosophy is explored by Guillaume Lejeune and W.J. 
Mander in this special issue. Bradley argued that relational thought was beset by 
contradiction and paradox and hence that reality could not be grasped through 
its means. His views on the nature of thought, language and relations were 
opposed to those of Green (as expressed in Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics) and 
also to the more Hegelian views of those who, like Bosanquet, believed in the 
ability of thought to reach reality. Bradley’s view was, then, neither Green’s nor 
Hegel’s – and this is sufficient to show both some of the internal differences 
among the British idealists and their relationship to Hegel. One result of this is 
that Bradley gives prominence to feeling, arguing that for a full understanding of 
reality, thought and language would have to be transcended in ‘thought’s happy 
suicide’ in which something more akin to the immediacy of feeling or intuition 
would alone be sufficient to grasp reality. (See Baldwin, ‘Thought’s Happy 
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Suicide’, Candlish ‘The Truth about F.H. Bradley’; on the differences between 
Bradley and Hegel, see Bedell, ‘Bradley and Hegel’.) 
Nettleship’s Philosophical Remains exerted a significant influence over 
other British idealists such as Bosanquet and even realists such as E.F. Carritt (of 
which more below). Nettleship’s writings are infused with fascinating themes 
regarding the complex interrelationships of language, thought and expression. 
(Much the same could be claimed for Ritchie, for example, Philosophical Studies, 
passim.) A.C. Bradley (‘Biographical sketch’, lii,n) recorded that ‘Green suggested 
to… [R.L. Nettleship] in early days [sic] that he might approach philosophy from 
the side of language; and various passages in his lectures and letters show an 
inclination to do so.’ In fact, even this remark understates the attention which 
Nettleship paid to language in his philosophical writings. Certainly he recognized 
the limitations of language, even of philosophical language, there being a great 
deal, for example, that in no way ‘admits of expression in language’ (Nettleship, 
‘Pleasure’, 11). 2  Nettleship (‘Spirit’, 30) traced much of ‘[t]he prejudice 
(sometimes right and sometimes wrong) against ‘asceticism,’ ‘spirituality,’ and 
the like,… [to] the fact that men must recognize a sort of average experience and 
express it in a sort of average language and habits.’ Nevertheless, as he made 
clear elsewhere (Letter to A.C. Bradley, January 1887, 88), literary devices such 
as ‘metaphor, simile, analogy, &c.’ could convey meanings that were lost when 
one engaged in a ‘translation’ of the poetic meaning into less figurative language. 
Part of the problem that was that the less symbolic mode of expression that 
characterized ‘ordinary language… seems in most cases to mean little more than 
the customary or else the historically earlier.’ (Nettleship, Letter to A.C. Bradley, 
January 1887, 88) Nettleship (Letter to A.C. Bradley, January 1890, 101) held this 
to be profoundly significant, because he understood words as being 
 
a form of action like any other, and a form which has its own specific 
properties. I mean that one could define more or less the various powers 
of words (rhetorical, poetic, logical), and compare them with the powers 
of acting on men in other ways (by example, by look, by gesture, by music, 
pictures, &c.). It seems to me so enlightening to extend the physical notion 
of energy to everything (which is simply Aristotelianism), and to feel that 
all that we call things, properties, &c., are forms of action and reaction, 
and that this is “being.” Language is an inviting subject… 
 
Nettleship developed these ideas more fully in his lectures on logic. (He 
rendered the first book of Lotze’s Logic, entitled ‘Of Thought (Pure Logic)’ for the 
British idealist-led translation of that work, noted above.) Nettleship began 
(‘Lectures on Logic’, 121) by emphasizing that the poet, the scientist and the 
philosopher all begin with ‘common facts’ but each ‘carries us an enormous 
distance beyond them.’ Yet, they travel in different directions. The poet uses 
metaphor and unusual associations between commonplace words and ideas to 
bring a new meaning to familiar images. The scientist and philosopher, on the 
hand, destroy the images in order to highlight the existing but previously-hidden 
significance of commonplace experience (Nettleship, ‘Lectures on Logic’, 121-
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22). Whereas the poet’s audience might find itself so mired in sensuality that it is 
unable to appreciate the beauty that he is attempting to convey, the thought of 
the scientist and the philosopher can appear to their audiences as ‘formal and 
pedantic, cold and unfeeling.’ (Nettleship, ‘Lectures on Logic’, 123) 
Yet, Nettleship saw at least the possibility of reconciling art, philosophy 
and science: ‘Unless we are prepared to say that imagination is essentially 
irrational, there must be a common basis in logic or reason in both [thought and 
imagination].’ (Nettleship, ‘Lectures on Logic’, 123) He based this claim on the 
belief (characteristic of the British idealists) that an utterance can be meaningful 
only to the extent that it is related to a self-conscious being who has interpreted 
the world using a rich and relatively coherent schema of symbols. These symbols 
might be constituted in any number of media – through words, gestures, music, 
or numerous other meaningful codes. Together these symbols constitute the 
individual’s language and ultimately their Weltanschauung (Nettleship, ‘Lectures 
on Logic’, 129-31). Nettleship’s (‘Lectures on Logic’, 129) underlying thought 
was clear: ‘no human experience is isolated, and all human experience is 
ultimately a kind of language or symbolism.’ The individual’s existence is 
inescapably based on his acts of interpretation of the full complexities and 
intimations of the symbols which are evoked through these acts (Nettleship, 
‘Lectures on Logic’, 129-30). Consequently, no act of interpretation can ever 
present a conscious awareness of the full ‘ever-growing complexity’ implicit 
within the current symbolic representation. Indeed, every interpretation is 
always driven beyond the initial meanings that it perceives in its object. 
Gradually, this process modifies existing symbols and creates new ones, thereby 
ensuring that potential meanings are constantly shifting. Obviously this entails 
that interpretations constantly shift as well. 
It is clear that for Nettleship thought is not necessarily restricted by the 
language-user’s facility with words. Rather, it is restricted by their command of 
symbols (‘the language of gesture, and the expression of thought in action’). As 
these symbols are not necessarily words, the individual who has access to only a 
small stock of words might well still possess rich and insightful interpretative 
and expressive capacities through a command of other symbols: in short, ‘it does 
not follow that people who are deficient in the use of [speech] are inarticulate.’ 
(Nettleship, ‘Lectures on Logic’, 131) This recognition of a vast array of types of 
thought had significant implications for Nettleship’s philosophy. For one thing, it 
encouraged him to be sanguine regarding the possibility of communication with 
other human beings, arguing that it presents little more difficulty than 
understanding one’s own internal thoughts. He (‘Lectures on Logic’, 139) argued 
that failures to reach an understanding with other persons are often due largely 
to an unwillingness to communicate: ‘truth is universal; it is ignorance, error, 
and prejudice that separate.’ 
Nettleship developed his position in numerous other ways as well. One of 
the most significant was his claim that the meaning of an utterance is inseparable 
from the mode in which it is expressed: for example, ‘the feeling is not fully felt 
till it is expressed, and in being expressed it is still felt, but in a different way. 
What the act of expression does is to fix and distinguish it finally; it then, and 
then only, becomes a determinate feeling.’ (‘Lectures on Logic’, 132) He argued 
(‘Lectures on Logic’, 129, 134) that this is true also when the expression relies on 
‘word-language’, and not least when it involves the use of metaphor and analogy 
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as techniques by which to articulate meanings that a plain use of words cannot 
convey. He was argued that naming a thought or feeling which was previously 
unnamed achieves three things: (i) it gives the new meaning ‘a more permanent 
position in our experience’, (ii) it gives it a more distinct reality in our 
consciousness, and (iii) it tends to ‘classify’ and therefore ‘identify’ and locate it 
relative to our other named meanings (Nettleship, ‘Lectures on Logic’, 135-36). 
This process had significant implications, For example, even though all thinking 
requires abstraction, our thinking becomes more concrete the more we relate 
things to each other in thought (Nettleship, ‘Lectures on Logic’, 142). 
Nettleship’s philosophical writings were cited frequently by other British 
idealists and his scholarship on Plato was read even more widely. Most notably, 
Bernard Bosanquet (for example, Principle of Individuality and Value, 55-65 
passim, 379, 394; Value and Destiny of the Individual, 36-43 passim, 108, 198, 264, 
296-97) cited Nettleship repeatedly in both sets of his Gifford lectures. As will 
become clear in the contributions by Grygieńć and Lejeune in this special issue, 
Bosanquet was an important contributor to the field himself, writing significant 
books on logic and emotions, as well as a lengthy History of Aesthetic and shorter 
related works such as Three Lectures on Aesthetic. Similarly, Nettleship seems to 
have influenced Collingwood. Possibly this was through the latter’s tutor, the 
realist E.F. Carritt, who followed John Cook Wilson and H.A Prichard in 
epistemology and W.D. Ross in ethics. Carritt also took a keen interest in the 
Italian idealists Croce and Gentile, especially their work on aesthetics and the 
philosophy of history. Yet, in his early book The Theory of Beauty, Carritt 
discussed not only Croce’s views, but also those of Nettleship. Carritt was 
especially struck by Nettleship’s claim that modes of expression exerted a 
determining effect on the thought expressed (Carritt, Theory of Beauty, 264-5, 
quoting Nettleship, ‘Lectures on Logic’, 132). In another passage in the same 
book (182) Carritt explicitly related Nettleship’s analysis to his (Carritt’s) own 
discussion of such themes in Croce’s philosophy. He liked the passage from 
Nettleship so much that, twenty years later, he reprinted it in his Philosophies of 
Beauty, (Philosophies of Beauty, 188). This interest appears to have fed through 
to the young R.G. Collingwood, who is likely to have read these and contiguous 
passages from Nettleship’s discussion of language, possibly having been directed 
to them by either Smith or Carritt. Collingwood’s later views were in harmony 
with both Nettleship’s lectures on logic and Croce’s aesthetics. Collingwood’s 
Principles of Art developed and refined some of these reflections into a full 
account of language, art and expression. Whatever the precise line of influence, it 
is clear that, irrespective of the debts that the later Oxford idealists had to figures 
such as Croce, Nettleship’s influential writings were sufficient to bring to their 
attention the importance of language and its relation to expression and the 
aesthetic. (On Collingwood, see the articles in this special issue by Guyer, 
Wiltsher and Wakefield.)  
As noted earlier, there was a wider variance between the idealists than 
often recognized. Here it is important to briefly introduce J.M.E. McTaggart, who, 
despite many affinities, differed from the other British idealists, not least in 
espousing a form of personal idealism and an ‘ontological idealism’. McTaggart 
(‘Ontological Idealism’, 251) summarized his position thus:  
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Ontologically I am an idealist, since I believe that all that exists is spiritual. 
I am also, in one sense of the term, a Personal Idealist. For I believe that 
every part of the content of spirit falls within some self, and that no part 
of it falls within more than one self; and that the only substances are 
selves, parts of selves, and groups of selves or parts of selves. On the other 
hand, I should say that epistemologically I am a Realist. I should say that 
knowledge was a true belief, and I should say that a belief was true when, 
and only when, it stands in a relation of correspondence to a fact. 
 
McTaggart is not a substance monist or an absolutist; and he advocates a 
correspondence theory of truth. His focus is not primarily on experience, as 
Bradley’s was, but on what is experienced, which he takes to be ontologically 
real. Hence he is an epistemological realist and his is a form of idealistic realism. 
McTaggart argues that our ordinary beliefs about material bodies and time are in 
error. He claims both that there are no material bodies, and that there is no 
change, and that without change, there can be no time. Hence, he argued, our 
ordinary understanding of parts, wholes, substances and their qualities, as well 
as time, are shown on closer inspection to be incompatible with the existence of 
material substances or the reality of time. McTaggart had a clear mystic bent. He 
argued that mysticism has two features: first, it asserts a greater unity in the 
universe than recognized in ordinary experience or science; secondly, it is 
possible to be aware of this unity in a way which brings the knower into a closer 
and more direct relation with what is known than can be done through 
discursive thought. His mystical insight reveals that our illusions about matter 
and time hide the true nature of reality from us. (Interesting contrasts can be 
drawn with Caird, ‘Essay on Mysticism’.)  It is not that he did not argue for this 
position, but for McTaggart the arguments are intended to bolster an initial 
intuition. In reality, he argued, what exists is a society of persons in loving 
relations. Persons are the ultimate reality, but they are not what we ordinarily 
believe them to be. Hence McTaggart presents us with a different ontology to the 
other leading idealists and the “community of loving souls” is the nearest he got 
to an absolute.   
Significant research about McTaggart continues to be published. 
However, a British idealist who, like Nettleship, has often been unfairly 
overlooked is J.A. Smith. (A notable exception to this lack of scholarly interest is 
Paylor, ‘J.A. Smith’.) Like so many Oxford philosophers of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, Smith was a Greek and Latin scholar, a translator and 
philologist, who took a delight in language in all its shapes and forms. 
Philosophically his position was essentially derivative of Croce’s, whose 
influence permeates both his inaugural lecture as Waynflete Professor in 1910 
on Knowing and Acting and his later The Nature of Art: An Open Letter to the 
Professor of Poetry. This short booklet essentially sought to apply Croce’s account 
of the aesthetic as a corrective to the views expressed in H.W. Garrod’s Inaugural 
Lecture as Oxford Professor of Poetry, The Profession of Poetry (1924). It consists 
primarily of a presentation of Croce’s view of art as knowledge of the individual. 
Its style, however, it has to be said, is rather irritating to the modern eye, 
especially in its reference to Croce not by name but as the ‘master’. Smith also 
wrote on artificial languages and on other philological topics. Perhaps more 
importantly in some ways, Smith was a philosophical colleague of Collingwood’s 
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from around 1909 to his death in 1939 and in a sense Collingwood was his 
protégé, Collingwood succeeding him as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical 
Philosophy in 1935. Smith is perhaps best now considered as an influence and a 
sounding board for others, rather than as an original philosopher in his own 
right. Yet, this should not lead us to overlook the way in which he, and the other 
idealists, understood language, for example, as something existing only in use, 
not as a tool existent prior to its use and unmodified by it. In this Smith 
anticipates themes developed by Collingwood in The Principles of Art and 
previously (if briefly) explored by Nettleship. 
Smith, together with Collingwood, Carritt and H. Wildon Carr, was 
instrumental in promoting the philosophy of the Italian neo-Idealists in Britain. 
The influence of the Italians can be found primarily in aesthetics and the 
philosophy of history, together with their accounts of the discrete activities of 
the knowing mind and their relations. Croce distinguished the theoretical, 
comprising art (and history), and philosophy from the practical, comprising the 
economic (or utility) and the ethical (or the good). Here the practical 
presupposed the theoretical (but not vice versa); and within each mode the 
second presupposed the first (but not vice versa). By contrast, Giovanni Gentile 
sought to capture a sense of thought in its activity rather than in its products. He 
termed thought in its actuality ‘pensiero pensante’ – the pure, creative act of 
thought or ‘thought thinking’. By contrast, ‘pensiero pensato’ referred to the 
result of thought, to ‘thought thought’. Within this he distinguished three typical 
moments: Art (the subjective or supposing moment), Religion (the Objective or 
assertive moment) and Knowledge or philosophy. This was an echo of Hegel’s 
view. Croce, by contrast, repudiated much of Hegel, especially his dialectic and 
hence tended to regard forms of experience as static. Collingwood, in Speculum 
Mentis, distinguished Art, Religion, Science, History, and Philosophy as his forms 
of experience. This corresponds in part to Hegel’s trio of art, religion and 
philosophy comprising ‘absolute spirit’. But in fact it is closer to Gentile in that 
Collingwood divides the third part of Gentile’s triad, ‘Knowledge’ into three 
moments to produce a quincunx. In this, Art, as the subjective or imaginative and 
‘supposing’ moment, is answered by Religion, the objective or ‘assertive’ 
moment. This in turn gives way to the subjective or questioning moment of 
Science; the objective or answering moment of History and, finally, to the 
absolute synthesis of Philosophy.  
Against this background, Michael Oakeshott can be understood as playing 
the same game of delineating modes of experience or different ways of 
understanding the world according to a set of defining presuppositions. Where 
Collingwood had delineated art, religion, science, and history as forms of 
experience, Oakeshott in Experience and its Modes, delineated the features of 
three modes of experience: science, history, and practice. Philosophy was 
experience without reservation, presupposition or arrest, in contrast to the 
modes which were characterized by the fact that they viewed reality from their 
own limited points of view, points constituted by their respective 
presuppositions (Experience, 347). In 1959 Oakeshott published The Voice of 
Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind, which added another mode, the poetic or 
aesthetic to his original characterisation of the modes of experience. Aesthetic or 
poetic activity consists of the mind being active in contemplating or delighting in 
objects and images irrespective of considerations of truth or utility (Voice, 32-3). 
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Underlying these different approaches is a common theme: the desire both to 
place different forms of experience on the map of human activity and the desire 
to account for the distinctive features of each form in itself, in the case of what 
we are considering in this special issue, this is the aesthetic in its various senses 
and associations. 
The above discussion has sketched the wider context of this special issue 
on the British idealists’ work on language, aesthetics and emotions. Before 
proceeding to articles themselves, it will now be useful to present brief 
introductions to each of them in turn. 
 
The articles 
This special issue contains seven articles covering a variety of overlapping 
themes. In ‘The General Will and the Speech Community: British idealism and the 
foundations of politics’, Janusz Grygieńć considers some of the most important 
yet understudied aspects of British idealist philosophy. By uncovering crucial 
intimations within British idealist social and political philosophy, Grygieńć 
exposes and explores the differing roles played by language within the writings 
of T.H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. Grygieńć establishes that, rather than 
being side issues, the applied aspects of British idealism relied upon what would 
now be called a philosophy of speech communities and linguistic structures. He 
argues that Green and Bosanquet enrich Hegel’s analysis of language, as well as 
developing new implications of their own. Grygieńć’s analysis presents a 
challenge to those working on British idealist social and political philosophy to 
trace out further the significance of linguistic philosophy in the key theories of 
such pivotal concepts as identity-formation, moral and legal rights, and the 
common good. 
 In ‘Emotion and Satisfaction in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley’ William 
Mander is engaged, first, in the negative task of rebutting those, such as Russell 
or Stove, who seek to convict idealism of substituting emotion for reason in 
(typically) both their conclusions and their arguments. By focussing on Bradley 
Mander is able to show that, first, reason’s demonstration of its own limits is 
inherently problematic and, second, that reason is bound to invoke feeling or 
emotion. Mander then goes on to explore the meaning of Bradley’s much used 
(and ambiguous) terms ‘satisfaction’ and ‘satisfactory’, illuminating their 
meaning and steering the reader away from the view that the criterion of 
intellectual attainment or success could be merely a feeling of satisfaction. 
 In ‘From the Bankruptcy of Relations to the Reality of Connections: 
Language and Semantics in Bradley and Bosanquet’, Guillaume Lejeune explores 
a profoundly significant difference between these two leading British idealist 
philosophers regarding the relationship of language to reality. This divergence of 
view is important not least because it is a key disagreement between two 
philosophers who are usually seen as being closely akin in many other areas. For 
F.H. Bradley, language provides at best a clue to reality, whereas Bosanquet sees 
language as the medium through which reality is given concrete shape. Lejeune 
shows Bosanquet to be defending Hegel’s claim that there is no ultimate 
distinction to be drawn between reality and language, a position that denies 
Bradley’s distinction between felt reality and discursive reality. Underpinning 
this distinction is a fundamental disagreement regarding the relationship of 
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thought and reality, something that highlights a fundamental distinction within 
British idealism itself. 
 In ‘Taking Love Seriously: McTaggart, Absolute Reality, and Chemistry’, 
Joe Saunders defends McTaggart’s emphasis on love as a central part of human 
life which can be reduced neither to feelings of pleasure nor to moral approval. 
Rather, love has a distinctive nature and value for individuals. Distancing 
McTaggart from Hegel’s claim that love entails marriage, Saunders argues 
McTaggart is correct to see love as an intimate element of a unity of 
consciousness between persons. Nevertheless, Saunders disagrees with some 
important elements of McTaggart’s philosophy, not least McTaggart’s claim that 
love can bind everyone together in absolute reality. Moreover, Saunders argues 
that McTaggart’s philosophy of love takes no account of the intensity and 
particularity of love, the ‘chemistry’ between particular people. 
 Paul Guyer, in ‘Re-enactment, Reconstruction, and the Freedom of the 
Imagination: Collingwood on History and Art’, makes a valuable contribution to 
the bringing together of different aspects of Collingwood’s philosophy. It is one 
of the frustrations of Collingwood scholarship that books such as The Idea of 
History are so often read in isolation from The Principles of Art and The New 
Leviathan where his account of mind, feelings and emotions are developed. This 
has bedevilled discussions of key themes such as re-enactment, and thought in 
relation to feeling and emotion. In his paper Guyer discusses the danger of 
Collingwood going too far in the other direction by perhaps assimilating art to 
the model of historical re-enactment. Thus, Guyer engages in a dual discussion of 
the role of imagination in both aesthetic and historical experience and shows 
how historical re-enactment might be deployed in enriching Collingwood’s 
account of aesthetic reconstruction. He shows both how the philosophy of 
history can illuminate aesthetics and vice versa, and also how it is necessary to 
ward off mistakes in the reading of the aesthetics or the philosophy of history. 
In Nicholas Wiltsher’s ‘Feeling, Emotion, and Imagination: In Defence of 
Collingwood’s Expression Theory of Art’, we find an interesting counterpart to 
Guyer’s paper. As a first step it valuably disambiguates the entanglements often 
produced by those critics who lump all so-called expressionist theories of art 
together. Wiltsher brings out very clearly some of the almost insuperable 
difficulties in advocating and defending a coherent expressionist theory of art – 
not least the problem of the identity of the emotion concerned. This is a 
generalizable problem: how is it possible to provide a plausible account of the 
activity of expressing an emotion in which we can assert that the emotion 
expressed shared an identity with the unexpressed emotion? The paradox seems 
to be that they need to be different for the act of expression to have meaning, but 
that if they are different then they lose their identity, whereas if they are the 
same there is nothing for the act of expression to do. No formulation of the 
expression theory seems easily able to get round this problem. Finally, in 
Wiltsher, as in Guyer, we again see the importance of imagination as the 
necessary middle term in the refining and clarifying of ideas. 
 This analysis of the role of imagination is important both for a fuller 
understanding of Collingwood’s philosophy in its interconnections and also as 
helping to provide the link between thought, feeling and the other elements of 
the philosophy of mind which Collingwood addressed, and which Gentile sought 
to address within the framework of his actual idealism. Turning to Gentile, we 
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find in J.R.M. Wakefield’s paper an important discussion of his attempts to 
account for ‘Thinking and Feeling in Actual Idealism’. Giovanni Gentile is an 
awkward figure for modern idealism. His philosophical views are rather extreme 
in many ways, and his reputation is indelibly linked with his extreme political 
views – he was not known as the philosopher of fascism for nothing. Despite 
these unpromising beginnings, his reputation is beginning to turn. He is 
increasingly regarded as an important interlocutor with Croce and De Ruggiero, 
as an influence on British idealists such as Collingwood, and as a philosopher in 
his own right. Wakefield shows clearly that, despite its weaknesses, Gentile’s late 
work on the philosophy of art is worth consulting for its attempt to address the 
issue of feeling. In addressing the question of feeling, it appears that Gentile 
asserts something that Bradley might be taken to be affirming – especially in 
relation to the notion of satisfaction. (Even though this is how some philosophers 
have read Bradley, arguably it was not actually his view.) Wakefield shows both 
the importance of Gentile’s account of feeling and illuminates its potential. This 
was a potential which has escaped the notice of many observers because it was 
only published in English in 1972 and then it was associated solely with Gentile’s 
philosophy of art, one of the lesser known parts of his philosophy. It is important, 
as Wakefield states, to show that Gentile’s account of feeling is inseparable from 
his account of thinking, that is, it is part of thinking, part of any real thinking 
experience. This marks an interesting contrast with Collingwood, who was much 
influenced by Gentile, but much readier to give full value to feelings and 
emotions in a way which is, as Wakefield suggests, more phenomenologically 
accurate than the approach adopted by Gentile. 
 By now it should be evident that the British idealists accorded great 
significance to the philosophical ambiguities and dilemmas surrounding 
language, aesthetics and the emotions. Moreover, the following articles make 
clear that they devoted a great deal of care to developing new understandings of 
these crucial aspects of a rich human life. Finally, it should also now be evident 
that historians of philosophy – and indeed contemporary philosophers as well – 
should pay far more attention than they do currently to the profound insights 
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